The Nebraska Personal Property Tax Crisis: \u3ci\u3eMAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment\u3c/i\u3e, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991) by Johnson, Tami L.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 1 Article 7
1992
The Nebraska Personal Property Tax Crisis:
MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization & Assessment, 238 Neb. 565, 471
N.W.2d 734 (1991)
Tami L. Johnson
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Tami L. Johnson, The Nebraska Personal Property Tax Crisis: MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment,
238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991), 71 Neb. L. Rev. (1992)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol71/iss1/7
Note
The Nebraska Personal Property Tax
Crisis: MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline,
Inc. v. State Board of Equalization
& Assessment, 238 Neb. 565,
471 N.W.2d 734 (1991)*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 323
II. Background ................................................ 324
III. Analysis ................................................... 330
A. Article VIII, Section 1: The Uniformity Clause ...... 330
B. Article III, Section 18: Nebraska's Special Legislation
and Equal Protection Clause .......................... 335
C. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution: The Equal Protection Clause ........... 337
D. Application of the MAPCO Decision .................. 338
IV. Conclusion ................................................. 342
INTRODUCTION
On July 10, 1991, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the state
property tax system violates the Nebraska Constitution and suggested
that the system also may violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization & As-
sessment,1 the court declared most of the personal property exemp-
tions unconstitutional and severely restricted the legislature's ability
to classify and exempt property under the present constitution.2 The
* The author wishes to thank Professor William H. Lyons, Associate Professor of
Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, for his invaluable guidance.
1. 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).
2. Although MAPCO was the result of a culmination of decisions, the holding took
the state by surprise. The court's decision was not the only surprise MAPCO had
to offer, however. The court broke with tradition by: 1) handing down the deci-
sion on a Wednesday and, 2) announcing the subject matter of the decision the
day before the opinion was distributed. The legislature was just commencing a
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decision has confused many Nebraska citizens and created a crisis for
the Nebraska Legislature.
The court has sent the message loud and clear to the legislature: It
is time to change the Nebraska property tax structure.3 However, the
court failed to guide the legislature on how to develop a politically
acceptable property tax system that passes judicial scrutiny and makes
economic sense. Unfortunately, the court leaves the citizens of Ne-
braska with more questions than this Note possibly can encompass. In
recognition of this limitation, this Note addresses three obstacles set
out by the court's opinion: Article VIII, section 1 of the Nebraska Con-
stitution (the "uniformity clause"), article III, section 18 of the Ne-
braska Constitution (the "special legislation clause") and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (the "Four-
teenth Amendment"). The Note analyzes each of the obstacles in the
framework of the property tax system considered by the court in
MAPCO. Finally, the Note examines the immediate consequences of
the court's decision.4
II. BACKGROUND
MAPCO is clearly an important case, but appreciating its signifi-
cance is contingent upon understanding the history that shaped the
Nebraska property tax problem. As this Note will explore, the heart
of the matter is the Nebraska Constitution, specifically article VIII,
section 1. Commonly referred to as the uniformity clause, article VIII,
section 1 requires that "taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly
and proportionately upon all tangible property and franchises." On
May 5, 1992, days before this Note went to press, article VIII, section 1
was amended by Amendment I. Amendment I essentially changes the
uniformity clause by providing different tax treatment for different
types of tangible property. Real estate will continue to be taxed uni-
formly, except as otherwise provided by the Nebraska Constitution,
while the legislature may classify, exempt or tax personal property, so
long as the decisions are reasonable.5 Complementing (or perhaps
complicating) the uniformity clause is article VIII, section 2, which au-
special session to re-examine L.B. 829, 92nd Leg., 1st Sess. (1991), the short-term
solution to the growing property tax dilemma. That may have had something to
do with the courts' unprecedented action.
3. Previously, the legislature has responded to the court's property tax decisions
with "quick fix" legislation addressed only to the specific problem identified in
the court's opinion. Consequently, the legislature would ignore the court's un-
derlying message and treat only the symptom, never addressing the cause of the
problem. L.B. 1 and L.B. 7, 91st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (1989), are good examples of
"Band-Aid" legislation. Both measures are discussed later in this Note.
4. This discussion is by no means comprehensive; the important issue of whether
MAPCO should be applied retroactively is worthy of its own in-depth analysis.
5. NEB. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1.
[Vol. 71:323
PROPERTY TAX CRISIS
thorizes the legislature to classify and exempt personal property as it
sees fit.6
Although the uniformity clause is the heart of the matter, it is the
case law leading up to MAPCO that makes the court's opinion so inter-
esting. The first important case is Grainger Brothers Co. v. State
Board of Equalization & Assessment, in which the term "all tangible
property" was held to mean that real property and tangible personal
property are in the same class for taxation purposes. 7 In 1974,
Stahmer v. State8 reviewed the constitutionality of article VIII, section
2. The court upheld Nebraska's statutory personal property exemp-
tions for: (1) agricultural income-producing machinery and equip-
ment; (2) business inventory; (3) feed, fertilizer and farm inventory;
and (4) grain, seed, livestock, poultry, fish, honey bees and fur bearing
animals.9 It appears the court in Stahmer believed that the legisla-
ture's power to classify and exempt personal property, granted by arti-
cle VIII, section 2, prevailed over the uniformity requirement of
article VIII, section 1.10
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Trailer Train Co. v. Leuenbergerll
introduced the issues raised in MAPCO. In Trailer Train, the court
determined "whether there was discriminatory tax treatment of rail-
roads in the Nebraska tax structure" in violation of section 306(1)(d)
of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (the "4-R
Act").12 "Section 306(1)(d) prohibits states from taxing transportation
property when such tax 'results in discriminatory treatment of a com-
mon carrier by railroad .... ,"13 The federal court found that the
Nebraska tax system discriminated against Trailer Train in violation
of the 4-R Act because tax exemptions applied to three fourths of the
commercial and industrial personal property in Nebraska, but did not
apply to railcars.1 4
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assess-
ment15 followed. In Northern Natural Gas, several centrally assessed
pipeline companies claimed they were entitled to the same treatment
6. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
7. Grainger Bros. Co. v. County Bd. of Equal., 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966).
8. 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974).
9. 1 WADE J. NEwHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORmITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE
TAXATION 1036 (2d ed. 1984).
10. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
582, 471 N.W.2d 734, 745 (1991).
11. 885 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1988).
12. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
578, 471 N.W.2d 734, 743 (1991); Railroad Reorganization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C.A. § 11503(b)(4)(West Sp. Pamph. 1991).
13. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
578, 471 N.W.2d 734, 743 (1991).
14. Id-
15. 232 Neb. 806, 443 N.W.2d 249 (1989).
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as railroads and car companies, whose personal property had been ex-
empted from taxation in order to comply with Trailer Train. The
court held that "[t]he state, by not taxing the personal property of rail-
roads and car companies, although acting involuntarily and under
compulsion of federal law, nevertheless, by complying with that man-
date, has denied [the pipeline companies] equal protection of the law
contrary to the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."16 The
court further held that, "if the [State] Board arbitrarily undervalues a
particular class of property so as to make another class of property
disproportionately higher, or achieves the same result because of legis-
lative action.... the complaining taxpayer's valuation [should be low-
ered] to such an extent so as to equalize it with other property in the
state."17
In November 1989, the legislature responded to Northern Natural
Gas by passing two bills: 1) L.B. 7, which exempted railroad rolling
stock from taxation and 2) L.B. 1, which redefined the term "real
property" to include pipelines.1 8 In March 1991, the court responded
to the legislature with Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Board of
Equalization & Assessment, declaring L.B. 7 unconstitutional and L.B.
1 irrelevant to the equalization of property.' 9
Next in line was MAPCO, the case that broke the camel's back.
MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc., Mid-America Pipeline Company,
Trailblazer Pipeline Company and Natural Gas Pipeline Company of
America ("taxpayers") appealed the Nebraska State Board of Equali-
zation and Assessment's ("State Board") decision to tax their property
at 92.13 percent of its actual value.20 In their consolidated appeal, the
taxpayers - centrally assessed public service entities - claimed that
the State Board erred in holding L.B. 1 and L.B. 7 constitutional and
"in failing to grant... requests for relief based on the absence of uni-
formity and proportionality of taxation, in violation of Neb. Const. art.
VIII, section 1" and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21
L.B. 1 amended section 77-103 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, so
that it read in pertinent part:
16. I& at 815, 443 N.W.2d at 256.
17. Id- at 815, 443 N.W.2d at 255-56.
18. L.B. 1, 91st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (1989); L.B. 7, 91st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (1989).
19. Natural Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 237 Neb. 357, 466
N.W.2d 461 (1991).
20. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
567-68, 471 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1991). Taxpayers had asked the State Board to equal-
ize their property with that of certain equipment and railroad rolling stock ex-
empted pursuant to L.B. 1 and L.B. 7 respectively. Id. at 567, 471 N.W.2d at 737.
21. Id. at 569-70, 471 N.W.2d at 738. The State Board acknowledged that the "Legisla-
ture has broad powers to define the nature of property for tax purposes, so long
as the definitions established are reasonable .. " Id. at 569, 471 N.W.2d at 738.
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The terms real property, real estate, and lands shall mean city and village lots
and all other lands, and all buildings,jixtures, improvements, cabin trailers or
mobile homes which shall have been permanently attached to the real estate
upon which they are situated, mines, minerals, quarries, mineral springs and
wells, oil and gas wells, overriding royalty interests and production payments
with respect to oil or gas leases, units of beneficial interest in trusts, the
corpus of which includes any of the foregoing, and privileges pertaining
thereto, and pipelines, railroad track structures, electrical and telecommuni-
cation poles, towers, lines, and all items actually annexed to such property,
and any interest pertaining to the real property or real estate.
The sole test for determining whether an item is afixture or an improvement
shall be whether there is actual annexation to the real property or real estate
or something appurtenant thereto. Unless specifically enumerated in this sec-
tion, real property and real estate shall not include machinery and equipment
used for business purposes or center pivot or other irrigation systems of a type
used for agriculture or horticultural purposes.2 2
L.B. 7 provides in pertinent part:
Railroad rolling stock shall be exempt from the personal property tax.
Railroad rolling stock shall mean locomotives, freight cars, and other flanged-
wheel equipment operated solely on rails and owned, leased, or used for or in
railroad transportation. For tax year 1989, this subsection shall apply to rail-
road rolling stock upon which no levy has been made or upon which no tax
may lawfully be collected.2 3
The Nebraska Supreme Court held L.B. 1 unconstitutional because
it violated the uniformity and special legislation clauses of the Ne-
braska Constitution. Citing its opinion in Natural Gas, the court held
L.B. 7 unconstitutional because "[the legislature had] no reasonable
basis for treating railroads differently from other carriers; therefore,
the distinction, as a classification and basis for an exemption from per-
sonal property tax .... result[ed] from special legislation, prohibited by
Neb. Const. art. III, section 18, and violat[ed] the uniformity clause of
Neb. Const. art. VIII, section 1."24
With regard to L.B. 1, the taxpayers contended that L.B. 1 [was]
unconstitutional on two bases: "(1) as an abuse of the legislature's
power to define, in that it tends to nullify certain provisions of Neb.
Const. art. VIII, sections 1 and 2, and (2) as it creates an arbitrary clas-
sification, in violation of Neb. Const. art. III, section 18."25 The court
agreed on both accounts. Although article VIII, section 2 arms the
legislature with the power to exempt personal property from taxation,
the court characterized the legislature's act as "arbitrarily declar[ing]
the personal property owned by an unfavored group of taxpayers to be
'fixtures,' so that it is presumably taxable as real estate .... ,"26 The
22. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-103 (1990).
23. L.B. 7, 91st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (1989).
24. Natural Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 237 Neb. 357, 371, 466
N.W.2d 461, 470 (1991).
25. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
571, 471 N.W.2d 734, 739 (1991).
26. Id. at 573, 471 N.W.2d at 740.
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court cited previous decisions that limited the definitional powers of
the legislature to definitions ordinarily understood to be embraced
within that term27 and decided that the property designated as "fix-
tures" in L.B. 1 is generally understood to be personal property rather
than real property.28 Thus, the court concluded that the legislature
had exceeded its constitutional powers to classify. That conclusion ap-
pears to have been overshadowed, however, by the court's next sen-
tence, which seems to affirm the fact that whether the property is
considered a "fixture" and thus real estate, or personal property, is
irrelevant because "personal property and real property are both 'tan-
gible property' under Nebraska law and must be equalized and taxed
uniformly pursuant to Neb. Const. art. VIII, section 1."29
The court also found that L.B. 1 violated article III, section 18,
which provides that "where a general law can be made applicable, no
special law shall be enacted." 30 Following guidelines recently estab-
lished in Haman v. Marsh,3 ' the court determined that "[t]he classifi-
cation [was] not based on a real and substantial difference between
'machinery and equipment used for business purposes or center pivot
or other irrigation systems of a type used for agricultural or horticul-
tural purposes' and the same machinery and equipment used for other
purposes," and thus violated article III, section 18.32
Recounting pivotal cases concerning Nebraska's discriminatory
property tax scheme, the court analogized Northern Natural Gas to
State Bank v. Endres.3 3 In Endres, the court reviewed the legislature's
classification of bank stock. The legislature had separated bank stock
from other intangible property and placed it on the same basis as tan-
gible property for taxation purposes. That was significant because Ne-
braska taxed intangible property at a lower rate than tangible
property, and federal law at the time provided that state taxation of
shares in the national banks "shall not be at a greater rate than is
assessed upon other moneyed capital .... ."34 Consequently, in viola-
tion of federal law, Nebraska was taxing the stock of state and na-
27. Id. at 572,471 N.W.2d at 739-40. See State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 191 Neb. 330, 215
N.W.2d 520 (1974)("household goods" could not include "major appliances at-
tached... to real property" where such property is considered real estate under
the common law of fixtures); Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424,
255 N.W. 551 (1934)(intangible personal property cannot be defined as tangible
personal property).
28. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
573, 471 N.W.2d 734, 740 (1991).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 574, 471 N.W.2d at 740.
31. 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
32. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
576, 471 N.W.2d 734, 742 (1991).
33. 109 Neb. 753, 192 N.W. 322 (1923).
34. U.S. REV. STAT. § 5219 (2d ed. 1878).
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tional banks located in Nebraska at a greater rate than other moneyed
capital. Having concluded that the national banks could not be taxed
lawfully on the same basis as tangible property, the court held that,
under the uniformity clause, state banks could not be taxed on the
same basis as tangible property either.35 The court in MAPCO be-
lieved the situtation it faced was similar to Endres in that federal law
had rendered invalid the present Nebraska state property tax
scheme.3 6
MAPCO also decided the continuing vitality of Stahmer. The court
addressed Stahmer sua sponte because, in the court's view, such analy-
sis was necessary to reach a reasonable and sensible disposition of the
issues presented.3 7 Recognizing that Stahmer addressed no issue of
federal law, the court overruled Stahmer, concluding that the court's
reasoning is now obsolete "in light of subsequent developments in fed-
eral law."38 As such, the personal property tax exemptions enumer-
ated in Nebraska Revised Statutes Section 77-202(6) through (9),
accounting for the exemption of three fourths of the commercial and
industrial property in Nebraska, were declared unconstitutional by
the court.39
The court determined that the State Board erred in failing to as-
sess or tax the rolling stock of railroad or carline companies operating
in Nebraska in 1990 and stated that the taxpayers were entitled to the
same tax treatment as other centrally assessed taxpayers.40 The court
then turned its attention to the appropriate relief. Characterizing the
taxpayers' plea for equalization at zero percent as a desire for exemp-
tion, the court denied the taxpayers' request.4 ' The court held that
such a remedy would be inappropriate because equalization cannot be
applied to property that is not taxed.42 The court clarified its conclu-
sion in Northern Natural Gas, explaining that it did not "exempt" the
taxpayers' personal property. Rather, it "remanded the matter to the
State Board, noting that the appellants' unitary value, including both
real and personal property, might need to be adjusted so as to achieve
uniformity and proportionality of taxation in compliance with Neb.
Const. art. VIII, section 1."43 Similarly, the court in MAPCO re-
manded the cause "with directions to assess the property of the [tax-
35. M APCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
580, 471 N.W.2d 734, 744 (1991).
36. Id. at 585, 471 N.W.2d at 747.
37. Id. at 584, 471 N.W.2d at 746.
38. Id. at 583, 471 N.W.2d at 745-46.
39. Id. at 585, 471 N.W.2d at 747.
40. Id. at 577, 471 N.W.2d at 742.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 579, 471 N.W.2d at 743.
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payers] and 'equalize' its value as required by article VIII, section 1."44
III. ANALYSIS
A. Article VIII, Section 1: The Uniformity Clause
In 1875, eight years after Nebraska's admission to the Union, Ne-
braska adopted a relatively brief and simple strict uniformity struc-
ture in its constitution. 45 The principal provision was that all property
be taxed in proportion to its value. 46 There also was a provision al-
lowing the exemption of public property and property used for reli-
gious, charitable and educational purposes.47 The 1920 constitutional
convention renumbered the pertinent provisions and relieved intangi-
ble property from the operation of the strict uniformity limitation.48
The principal provision, article VIII, section 1, read: "Tiaxes shall be
levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible
property and franchises, and taxes uniform as to class may be levied
by valuation upon all other property."49 The 1920 change carved out a
single substantive exception to strict uniformity, while retaining the
strict general limitation.50
In 1952, Nebraska voters ratified an amendment to section 1 of arti-
cle VIII, authorizing a different method of taxing motor vehicles. 51
Several significant amendments authorizing exceptions for designated
classes of personal property followed, including special treatment of
agricultural or horticultural property, intangible property, livestock,
and grain and seed.52 Nebraska voters also approved several amend-
ments to the exemption provision, section 2 of article VIII.53 Most no-
tably, the following provision was added in 1970: "The Legislature
may classify personal property in such manner as it sees fit, and may
exempt any of such classes or may exempt all personal property from
taxation."M
On the surface, the amendments appear compatible and, in fact,
were recognized as such by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stahmer.
The court in Stahmer interpreted the amendment to section 2 of arti-
44. Id. at 585, 471 N.W.2d at 747.
45. 1 WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE
TAXATION 1714 (2d ed. 1984); 2 WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORM-
ITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 1714 (2d ed. 1984).
46. 1 WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE
TAXATION 1017 (2d ed. 1984).
47. Id. at 1018.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1024.
51. Id. at 1033.
52. Id. at 1019-20.




cle VIII to confer broad classification and exemption powers on the
legislature.5 5 The power to classify and exempt personal property was
separate and distinct from the requirement of section 1 of article VIII
to equalize or tax uniformly. The court emphasized that section 2
"represents a special constitutional provision adopted later than and
with full knowledge of the [other] constitutional provisions .. .[and]
[w]hen general and special provisions of a state Constitution are in
conflict, the special provisions should be given effect to the extent of
their scope, leaving the general provisions to control when the special
provisions do not apply."5 6
Rather than resorting to a rule applied to "conflicts" of "general
and special provisions," the court in Stahmer could have found sup-
port for its decision by recognizing the clear distinction between equal-
ization and exemption. An exemption is an element of the initial
process of determining the tax base, guided by article VIII, section 2.
Equalization is the process of ensuring that the tax base, property not
exempted, is taxed uniformly according to article VIII, section 1. Ac-
knowledging that difference eliminates the tension that the court per-
ceived between sections 1 and 2 of article VIII.
Regardless of the decision's foundation, Stahmer is an exception in
an otherwise unbroken line of cases in which the Nebraska Supreme
Court has interpreted article VIII, section 1 strictly.5 7 Repeated at-
tempts to liberalize the limitation of the state's uniformity clause, by
specific constitutional amendment, have failed. The court vigorously
has applied the requirement of absolute uniformity.58 The Nebraska
Supreme Court, clearly in the minority with its strict uniformity re-
quirement,59 refuses to join the growing national trend towards
liberalization. 60
Tracing the line of cases, it appears the court often employs federal
law to avoid the liberation of the uniformity clause. Endres, Northern
55. Id. at 1036.
56. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 67-68, 218 N.W.2d 893, 896 (1974)(quoting Elmen v.
State Board of Equal. & Assess., 120 Neb. 141, 231 N.W. 772 (1930)).
57. 1 WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFoRMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE
TAxATION 1040 (2d ed. 1984).
58. Id. at 1038.
59. 2 WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE
TAXATION 1725 (2d ed. 1984). In order to understand the context of the term
"strict uniformity," it may be helpful to know the different types of uniformity
clauses used in other states. As of 1983, six states did not have any form of uni-
formity clause (Connecticut, New York, Iowa, Montana, Alaska and Hawaii).
Slightly more than half of the states - 27 out of 50 - had literal liberal provi-
sions with such clauses as "taxes shall be uniform upon the same classes of prop-
erty", "taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects", and "taxation
shall be equal and uniform." Id. at 1725.
60. 1 WADE J. NEwHousE, CoNsTrruTIoNAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE
TAXATION 1040 (2d ed. 1984).
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Natural Gas and MAPCO are illustrative of the court's use of federal
law. A closer review of those cases exposes between them a distinc-
tion that merits the use of federal law in Endres alone. In Endres, the
issue was the taxation of certain intangible property, bank stock,
which - as previously stated - was relieved to some extent from the
operation of the strict uniformity requirement. 61 Specifically, section
1, article VIII gave the legislature the power to classify intangible
property, but required that any tax on intangible property be uniform
within the class of property subject to the tax.62 Bank stock, both
state and federal, comprised the class of intangible property Nebraska
sought to tax. Because federal law prohibited Nebraska from taxing
national bank stock, only some of the intangible property in the class
of bank stock remained subject to tax. As a result, imposing the tax
on the state bank stock violated the uniformity clause.
The situations posed in Northern Natural Gas and MAPCO are dif-
ferent. The cases involved the taxation of tangible personal property,
which is not recognized as a separate class of property for purposes of
constitutional analysis.63 As stated previously, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has held that, except to the extent of special classes of property
specifically authorized by the Nebraska Constitution, real and tangible
personal property are in the same class and, therefore, must be taxed
uniformly.64 Thus, the 4-R Act was unnecessary to the court's deci-
sion in Northern Natural Gas. The court simply could have construed
strictly the uniformity clause, as it did in MAPCO, and held that differ-
ent tax treatment of tangible personal property is unconstitutional.
The tangible personal property of the pipeline and railroad companies
must be taxed uniformly because they are members of the same class
of property.
However, the court in Northern Natural Gas focused on the ineq-
uity caused by the 4-R Act. As such, the court held that, based on the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state could not constitutionally tax the
personal property of pipeline companies, but exempt the personal
property of railroads and carlines. Assuming the court followed its
practice of not acknowledging the difference between equalization and
exemption, it appears the court overlooked the fact that the tax was
unconstitutional with or without the 4-R Act. Nebraska's tax system,
which exempted 75 percent of commercial and industrial personal
property, was the sole cause of the discrimination which prompted the
61. 2 WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE
TAXATION 1761 (2d ed. 1984).
62. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
63. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
573, 471 N.W.2d 734, 740 (1991).
64. Grainger Bros. Co. v. County Bd. of Equal., 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966).
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exemption of the railroads' and carlines' personal property.6 5
It is important to note that, had the court acknowledged the dis-
tinction between equalization and exemption, its decision in Northern
Natural Gas may have been different. Northern Natural Gas involved
an exemption, necessitated by federal law, and arguably did not re-
quire equalization.66 As noted in Stahmer, section 2, article VIII pro-
vided the constitutional basis for the exemptions of 75 percent of the
tangible personal property within the State of Nebraska.67 Federal
law, the impetus, required the exemption of the railroad's personal
property. Only the remaining property was required to be taxed
uniformly.
It was inappropriate for the Nebraska Supreme Court to employ
the exemptions in its analysis. When the federal court evaluated Ne-
braska's personal property exemptions in search of a discriminatory
tax, it evaluated the system as a whole to determine whether the state
had unreasonably burdened interstate commerce by taxing rail carrier
property. The federal court did not invalidate the state's general abil-
ity to exempt certain property. Furthermore, as stated previously,
there is no state constitutional mandate to equalize exempt property
with nonexempt property.
Unfortunately, the court blurred the concepts of equalization and
exemption and incorrectly diagnosed the ailment. Such a contention
is supported by the court's response to the "Band-Aid" legislation
passed after Northern Natural Gas.6 8 Passed in special session, L.B. 1
and L.B. 7 attempted to limit the potential effect of Northern Natural
Gas by exempting property within the 4-R Act's coverage. The court
declared such legislation unconstitutional in Natural Gas and MAPCO,
thus indicating that the real issue is the Nebraska Constitution and
not the dilemma created by the interaction between the federal law
and the uniformity clause. Handicapped by this blurred vision of
equalization, the MAPCO court stepped forward to overrule Stahmer.
Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize that the "subsequent de-
velopments in federal law" gave the court no cause to overrule
Stahmer. The court in MAPCO based its decision solely on a literal
interpretation of the uniformity clause, holding that uniformity re-
quires that all tangible property, personal and real, be treated the
same for tax purposes.6 9 This is the same uniformity clause and the
same exemptions that were before the court in Stahmer. The 4-R Act,
65. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
581-82, 471 N.W.2d 734, 745 (1991).
66. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 232 Neb. 806, 815, 443
N.W.2d 249, 256 (1989).
67. Stabmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 67, 218 N.W.2d 893, 896 (1974).
68. See supra note 3.
69. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
581-82, 471 N.W.2d 734, 745 (1991).
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as previously discussed, was unnecessary to the Nebraska Supreme
Court cases that followed. The only contribution made by the "federal
law" was the emphasis it placed on the various tax treatments applied
to the tangible personal property located in Nebraska.70 Thus, the
court's strict interpretation of the uniformity clause was no more im-
perative in 1991 than it was in 1974.
It is curious that, irrespective of the legislature's power to exempt,
the court declared unconstitutional the exemptions enumerated in (6)
through (9). Although the court attacked only exemptions (6)
through (9), it appears no exemption is free from the court's reason-
ing.71 All property must be taxed or no property may be taxed. That
reasoning places the legislature in an impossible situation. Taxing all
property would be practically and politically impossible, and taxing no
property would be a fiscal disaster. Either way, the legislature is sub-
ject to criticism. No Nebraska citizen would want all of his or her
property taxed, particularly when one considers the administrative
problems incurred when attempting to tax all property including inci-
dental household goods. And although Nebraska citizens initially
would enjoy the thought of no property tax, the consequences would
not be attractive. The state's property tax is the primary source of
revenue for local governments. If the tax were abolished, the lost rev-
enue would have to be generated from the sales and/or income tax,
both of which presently fund the state government. And because the
state government does not appear to have sufficient funds to share, an
increase in the rates could be expected.
In summary, the court's view of the uniformity clause, expressed in
Northern Natural Gas and MAPCO, is "irreconcilable with the consti-
tutional authorization for tax classification and exemption," as pro-
vided in section 2 of article VIII.72 Therefore, the legislature should
act. The court has passed the buck to the legislature, or - more ap-
propriately - passed the accounts receivable. Considering the court's
obsession with strict construction, the liberal practices of other states,
and the need for the legislature to respond to the state's needs and
desires, the uniformity clause should be repealed. The legislature -
not the court - should have the power to establish the fiscal policy for
70. Should the court be referring to a development of federal law other than the 4-R
Act, its role in the decision to overrule Stahmer still is questionable for two rea-
sons: 1) some states have no uniformity clause or literal liberal provisions; See
supra note 60, and 2) the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate such result;
See infra note 94.
71. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
591-92,471 N.W.2d 734, 750-51 (1991)(Shanahan, J., concurring in part, and in part
dissenting).





B. Article H, Section 18: Nebraska's Special Legislation and Equal
Protection Clause
A discussion of article III, section 18 is important for two reasons.
First, it was a component of the court's decision that held L.B. 1 and
L.B. 7 unconstitutional.74 But more importantly, it is yet another ob-
stacle to a vital Nebraska property tax system. As indicated by Judges
White and Fahrnbruch in their concurring opinion in Natural Gas:
When property, regardless of whether it is real or tangible personal property,
is classified so that it provides exemption from taxation to all but a small
amount of property, the classification and exemption may well be unreasona-
ble and arbitrary and may fall within the prohibition of Neb. Const. art. M,
section 18, which is this state's 'equal protection clause'. 75
Article III, section 18 does not prohibit classifications, provided
they are not arbitrary.76 Even classifications granting special or exclu-
sive privileges to their members are constitutional if their primary
purpose is the promotion of the public welfare, rather than the private
benefit of the grantees. 77 The established rule is that classification is
permitted "if the classification is reasonable and the tax operates uni-
formly upon all members of the class."78
At this juncture, it appears that the present Nebraska property tax
system arguably would pass judicial scrutiny if the present uniformity
clause were repealed and the legislature were allowed to classify tan-
gible property. This contention is particularly true because "[t]he
power of classification rests with the Legislature and cannot be inter-
fered with by the courts unless it is clearly apparent that the Legisla-
ture has by artificial and baseless classification attempted to evade and
violate provisions of the Constitution prohibiting local and special leg-
islation."79 It is not clear that the Nebraska Legislature has used an
73. Those who are concerned about the legislature's use of that power and its ten-
dency to be influenced by special interest groups should consider the protection
of the Nebraska Supreme Court's interpretation of article HI, section 18 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, as discussed in the following sections.
74. See MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb.
565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. &
Assess., 237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991).
75. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 237 Neb. 357, 375, 466
N.W.2d 461, 472 (1991)(White, J.; Fahrnbruch, J., concurring).
76. See, e.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Hall, 129 Neb. 669, 680, 262 N.W. 835, 841 (1935).
77. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 466, 283
N.W.2d 12, 25 (1979).
78. Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 102, 18 N.W.2d 664, 668 (1945).
79. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
574, 471 N.W.2d 734, 741 (1991)(quoting City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb.
256, 266, 175 N.W.2d 74, 81 (1970)(citations omitted)).
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artificial or baseless classification.8 0
Equal protection challenges based on article III, section 18 are de-
termined by a rational basis test.8 1 ""All that is required is that there
be a rational relationship between a legitimate state interest and the
statutory means selected by the Legislature to accomplish that pur-
pose."8 2 Again, it appears as though the Nebraska tax system would
pass muster. However, in Natural Gas, the Nebraska Supreme Court
employed a very strict view of what is required. In Natural Gas, the
court held L.B. 7 unconstitutional because the court "fail[ed] to see
any real and substantial difference between personal property used
for income production by one type of business and the same type of
income-producing personal property used by another type of busi-
ness."8 3 The court explained that:
classification must rest upon some difference in situation or circumstance
which, in reason, calls for distinctive legislation for the class. The class must
have a substantial quality or attribute which requires legislation appropriate
or necessary for those in the class which would be inappropriate or unneces-
sary for those without the class. 8 4
The court further characterized as "illusory" the legislature's finding
and declaration that a "rational basis exists to classify railroad rolling
stock as a separate and distinct class of property."8 5
Haman followed, solidifying the requirement that there be a "sub-
stantial difference."8 6 Identifying two separate tests, the court in Ha-
man explained that article III, section 18 is both an equal protection
clause and a prohibition against special legislation.8 7 A classification
violating the equal protection clause implicates a rational basis test,88
while "[t]he test of validity under the special legislation prohibition is
more stringent... [requiring] some substantial difference of situation
or circumstances that would naturally suggest the justice or expedi-
ency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be
classified."8 9
80. In fact, as Judge Shanahan explains, immobility is a plausible basis for the real
estate classification in L.B. 1. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565, 589, 471 N.W.2d 734, 748-49 (1991)(Shanahan, J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting).
81. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 712, 467 N.W.2d 836, 846 (1991)(citing Distinctive
Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989)).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 237 Neb. 357, 371, 466
N.W.2d 461, 470 (1991)(emphasis added).
84. Id. at 370, 466 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting State ex rel. Cone v. Bauman, 120 Neb. 77,
82-83, 231 N.W. 693, 695 (1930)).
85. L.B. 7 § 1(4), 91st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (1989)(codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-
202.47 (1990)).
86. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
87. Id. at 712, 467 N.W.2d at 846.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 713, 467 N.W.2d at 846-47.
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The distinction drawn by the Haman court becomes significant as
one reviews the language in Natural Gas and MAPCO. In both opin-
ions, the legislation was held unconstitutional because the classifica-
tion was "not based on a real and substantial difference."90 It
therefore appears that, when reviewing property tax classifications,
the Nebraska Supreme court will apply the more stringent test for
special legislation rather than the rational basis test. Regardless of
the label, the court will construe strictly article III, section 18, and
require the legislature to articulate a substantial difference inherent
in the property. Thus, the legislature's task becomes more difficult
because the court will always have the last word on what constitutes a
"substantial difference."
C. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: The Equal
Protection Clause
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court in past Nebraska
property tax cases and certainly may be utilized in future tax cases.
Although the per curiam opinion in MAPCO did not specifically ad-
dress the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, it was the
basis of the decision in Northern Natural Gas. The Nebraska Supreme
Court in Northern Natural Gas agreed with the proposition that "in-
tentional and systematic undervaluation of other taxable property in
the same class [whether by legislative enactment, the Board or a fed-
eral court's judgment] ... violates the equal protection clause."91 The
court further explained that "[t]he equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates that the same result be reached
with respect to the personal property of [the pipeline companies] as
that in the case of the railroad and car companies." 92 Again, the lan-
guage seems to indicate that the court is seeking absolute equality.
The court's view of the equal protection clause appears to be se-
verely restrictive in comparison with the United States Supreme
Court's reading of the clause. The Supreme Court recognizes that the
equal protection clause allows classification of different types of prop-
erty, provided there is a rational basis for the classifications.9 3 The
Court will uphold "a classification, though discriminatory ... if any
90. See MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb.
565, 574, 471 N.W.2d 734, 741 (1991); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of
Equal. & Assess., 237 Neb. 357, 371, 466 N.W.2d 461, 470 (1991).
91. Walter Hellerstein, Equal Protection Run Amok?: An Analysis of the Nebraska
Supreme Court's Decision in the Northern Natural Gas Case, TAX NOTEs, No-
vember 20, 1989, at 997.
92. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 232 Neb. 806, 816, 443
N.W.2d 249, 256 (1989).
93. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
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statement of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
it."94 Further, the Court does not require absolute equality, acknowl-
edging that "the States have large leeway in making classifications and
drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of
taxation."95
Whether the Nebraska Supreme Court will continue to interpret
strictly the federal equal protection clause is difficult to determine be-
cause the court in Northern Natural Gas may have incorporated the
Fourteenth Amendment only to disguise the real problem: the de-
manding requirements of Nebraska's uniformity clause. However, if
the uniformity clause is repealed and the legislature identifies classifi-
cations based on substantial inherent differences, it is possible that the
Nebraska Supreme Court might use this one last obstacle to reach its
ideal of absolute equality, even though the classifications probably
would be permissible under the analysis of the United States Supreme
Court. It is only certain that the federal equal protection clause will
be yet another consideration for the Nebraska Legislature, as indi-
cated by the concurring opinions of Judges White and Fahrnbruch in
Natural Gas and MAPCO.96
D. Application of the MAPCO Decision
Presently, compliance with MAPCO requires the State Board to re-
valuate and assess the affected personal property and all real property
in the state to arrive at a uniform and proportionate result.97 This
approach is much different than that employed by the court in North-
ern Natural Gas and Natural Gas. In Northern Natural Gas and Nat-
ural Gas, the court "correct[ed] th[e] constitutional inequity by
lowering the complaining taxpayer's valuation to such an extent so as
to equalize it with other property in the state."9 8 The court in MAPCO
expressed its disapproval of such language and emphasized that the
taxpayers' remedy "does not involve 'equalization.' "99
94. Hellerstein, supra note 91, at 998. (quoting Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 528 (1959)).
95. Lelnhausen v. Lakeshore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973).
96. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
585, 471 N.W.2d 734, 747 (1991)(Fahrnbruch, J., concurring with majority opinion
but, interestingly, believing it unnecessary to expressly rely on the Fourteenth
Amendment); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 237 Neb.
357, 373, 466 N.W.2d 461, 471 (1991).
97. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
579, 471 N.W.2d 734, 743 (1991).
98. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal & Assess., 237 Neb. 357, 373, 466
N.W.2d 461, 471 (1991)(quoting Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. &
Assess., 232 Neb. 806, 815, 443 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1989)).
99. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 565,
577, 471 N.W.2d 734, 742 (1991).
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The remedy specified by the court placed the State Board in a pre-
dicament because the court's order essentially requires the impossible
- the location and valuation of all property that should have been on
the rolls in 1989. On October 30, 1991, the State Board responded to
the order and attempted to comply by reducing the taxpayers' equal-
ized unit value by 18.81 percent, the ratio of the value of all exempt
property in Nebraska to the total value of property in the state.100
The taxpayers, dissatisfied with the State Board's order, have ap-
pealed, contending that the taxation of 81.19 percent of their unit
value is contrary to the mandate of the Nebraska Supreme Court and
violates the uniformity clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 ' In
their brief, the taxpayers cite the Nebraska Attorney General's official
opinion advising the State Board against the aggregate ratio approach
for equalization, noting that the court in Northern Natural Gas did not
accept such methodology. 02 The State Board has not complied with
the court's mandate, but such compliance appears impossible. Consid-
ering such difficulty, one may wonder whether the MAPCO decision
was delivered primarily to make a statement to the legislature.
Whatever the case, the appeal is likely to force the court to explain
exactly what it meant when it remanded the cause with directions to
assess the taxpayers' property and "equalize" its value in accordance
with the uniformity clause.
Whether MAPCO will be applied retroactively introduces yet an-
other interesting issue. The doctrine governing retroactivity 03 and
prospectivity' 04 in unconstitutional state tax cases appears unset-
tled.105 Previously, the three-part Chevron'0 6 test routinely had been
applied to determine whether a new court ruling was to be applied
prospectively. The Chevron test consists of the following: 1) whether
the decision establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression, 2)
whether retrospective operation will further the rule's purpose, and 3)
whether the equities of the case favor retroactive application.iO 7
100. Brief of Appellants for Appeal from the State Board of Equalization and Assess-
ment at 2, MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238
Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991)(Nos. A-91-1069, A-91-1070, A-91-1071 and A-91-
1072).
101. Id. at 2-3.
102. Id. at 4.
103. For purposes of this Note, the doctrine of retroactivity will refer to application of
the new rule to reviewable prior cases and all subsequent cases.
104. For purposes of this Note, the doctrine of prospectivity will refer to application of
the new rule to claims accruing subsequent to the date of the decision in which
the law was changed.
105. See the five separate opinions of James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.
Ct. 2439 (1991).




Applying the Chevron tests to MAPCO yields no solid conclusion.
Considering the first test, MAPCO may require a prospective applica-
tion. MAPCO overruled Stahmer, a clear past precedent, and held sev-
eral property tax exemptions unconstitutional. However, it may be
argued that the MAPCO decision was reasonably foreseeable given the
development of the 4-R case law in Nebraska. The "court has consist-
ently interpreted the discriminatory taxation of railroad rolling stock
to be in violation of federal law" and that "the same illegally discrimi-
natory tax system was at issue in Trailer Train, Northern Natural
Gas, [and] Natural Gas."10s The two remaining tests are also inconclu-
sive; the purpose of the court's decision may be furthered by retroac-
tive application, but such application would "produce substantial
inequitable results by depleting the state treasury."10 9
In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,110 the Chevron analysis is not
imperative. In Beam, the Court held that the new rule announced in
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias111 should be applied retroactively be-
cause "similarly situated litigants should be treated the same."" 2
Without considering the Chevron analysis, Justice Souter based the
determination on "principles of equality and stare decisis."113 In one
of three concurring opinions, Justice Blackmun further expressed his
belief that the Court's judicial responsibility is fulfilled by requiring
retroactive application of each new rule announced.1l 4 Although in
Beam the Court applied the decision retroactively, it is difficult to as-
certain what the Court will do in the future, considering there were
five separate opinions written on the case.
However, considering present law and Justice Souter's reasoning,
it appears that MAPCO may be applied retroactively. That contention
is further supported by the Nebraska Supreme Court's recent review
of a tax refund claim. In Dairyland Power Cooperative v. State Board
of Equalization & Assessment, the court affirmed the district court's
order that the plaintiff's taxes be refunded pursuant to section 77-
1775,115 which specifically provides for the refund of "invalid" taxes.
The court held that the tax levied against the rolling stock of the
108. Dairyland Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 696, 711, 472
N.W.2d 363, 372 (1991).
109. In American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), the Court
considered the depletion of the state treasury a factor in favor of applying the
decision prospectively.
110. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
111. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
112. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2446 (1991).
113. Id. at 2440.
114. Id. at 2450.
115. Dairyland Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. at 711, 472
N.W.2d at 372 (1991).
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claimants was in violation of section 306(1)(d) of the 4-R Act and was
therefore invalid within the meaning of section 77-1775.116
Anticipating the court's response to Dairyland, the legislature fo-
cused attention on ways to minimize the potential financial disrup-
tions caused by the possible influx of refund claims. The recently
enacted legislation introduces three main limitations. First, the relief
granted in section 77-1735 and 77-1775 is limited to taxes that are ille-
gal or a result of a misunderstanding or honest mistake, for any reason
other than the valuation or equalization of the property.1' 7 Second,
the legislature has attempted to reduce the number of people entitled
to a refund. "A person shall not be entitled to a refund [for illegal
taxes paid] unless [he or she has] filed a claim with the county treas-
urer or prevailed in an action against the county" when the county has
refused to make a refund, "even if another person has successfully
challenged a similar tax or payment."1 1 8 Similarly, section 77-1736.04
limits refunds to only those who have "instituted legal proceedings to
declare the tax or penalty unconstitutional."119 Third, the legislature
has attempted to limit court orders affecting real or personal property
tax to prospective application.12 0 Essentially, the legislature codified
the Chevron test vesting the determinination with the tax commis-
sioner, subject to the court's review.
The ramifications of MAPCO are still unclear, notwithstanding the
Dairyland decision and recent legislation. The legislature's efforts
were not realized in Dairyland as the court held that the "case[]
should be decided under the statutes existing at the time the action[]
[was] commenced."'' 2 Further, the issue in Dairyland was the dis-
criminatory taxation of car company personal property, which was
clearly a violation of the 4-R Act as supported by established case law.
Thus, the court was able to easily declare the tax "invalid" for pur-
poses of section 77-1775. Whereas, in MAPCO, an argument can be
made that the invalidity of the tax was not so prevalent, nor was the
taxpayers' property taxed for an "illegal or unauthorized purpose."'122
It appears the legislature has done everything it can to limit the
refunds that are bound to follow a decision such as MAPCO. The
United States Supreme Court, through McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,123 recently gave the state its blessing
to retain substantial flexibility in crafting the form of retroactive re-
116. Id.
117. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1735 & 77-1775 (Supp. 1991).
118. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-1735 (Supp. 1991).
119. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1736.04(3)(Supp. 1991).
120. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1736.04(4) to (6)(Supp. 1991).
121. Dairyland Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 238 Neb. 696, 472 N.W.2d
363 (1991).
122. Id.
123. 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
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lief. However, the real issue is whether the court will interpret Beam
to require the retroactive application of MAPCO so "similarly situated
taxpayers will be treated the same."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska property tax structure is in desperate need of atten-
tion. After MAPCO, there is no hiding behind the 4-R Act; the prob-
lem is clearly with the Nebraska Supreme Court's strict interpretation
of the uniformity clause. The court's reading of article VIII, section 1
contradicts the legislature's ability to classify and exempt personal
property as provided in section 2 of article VIII. The court's reasoning
does more than declare unconstitutional the personal property tax ex-
emptions for: agricultural income-producing machinery and equip-
ment; business inventory; feed, fertilizer and farm inventory; and
grain, seed, livestock, poultry, fish, honey bees and furbearing ani-
mals. The court's reasoning also identifies every exemption for tangi-
ble property in Nebraska as free game.
In order for the Nebraska Legislature to reclaim its power to deter-
mine the fiscal policy of the state, the uniformity clause must be re-
pealed. The state need not worry about the legislature being held
hostage by influential special interest groups because any classifica-
tion that the legislature defines must be based on a substantial inher-
ent difference and pass the scrutiny of the Nebraska Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the legislature
will gain some flexibility in its ability to respond to the changing needs
of the state, but will not be able to escape entirely from the court's
strict judgment.
Tami L. Johnson, '93
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